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1ST is a form of interpretationism; the ontology of beliefs and desires is not considered independent of their epistemology.
As Dennett has put it (restricting himself to beliefs only in this quote): My thesis will be that while belief is a perfectly objective phenomenon (that apparently makes me a realist), it can be discerned only from the point of view 
Phenomenal Causation
The claim I wish to make in this brief section is that the position described above allows at least for the possibility of a form of mental causation, sometimes called phenomenal causation (Tye 1995 even letting new kinds of urges emerge and finding a strategy of action that does justice to most or the most urgent (literally) ones (we need not think of this in terms of a homunculus who is busy selecting some urges and blocking others, of course). This process can be described as beliefs and desires interacting, but also as a form of self interpretation. The outcome of such a process can be portrayed as the formation of an intention to act or as the desire for x and the belief that y-ing will achieve x. The point is that considering this intention or belief/desire pair or preceding beliefs and desires to be merely causally relevant in no way implies the rejection of 
